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It is common knowledge to everyone who has dealt with the history of 
the Byzantine Empire that non-Greek mercenaries were employed by the 
Emperors since the times of the Late Roman period, frequently and in 
large numbers depending on the occasional needs of the Imperial army for 
additional high-quality manpower1. Narrowing down our analysis to the 
period of the “Reconquest” (956-1025), a time when the Empire was in 
desperate need for large quantities of able-bodied and experienced soldiers 
to conduct its wars in the East and the Balkans, we have ample examples of 
large bodies of non-Greek troops finding their way to the Imperial pay-rolls, 
not yet termed as «μισθοφόροι» (the person who receives pay in Greek) 
but rather as “allies” (σύμμαχοι) or “foreigners” (ἐθνικοί)2. It was roughly 
1. On the employment of non-“Roman” mercenaries in the fourth century: J.h 
lieBeschueTz, Barbarians and Bishops: army, church and state in the reign of Arcadius, 
Oxford 1990, 7-85.
2. Compare with: Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, Greek 
text edited by Gy. MoraVcsik; English translation by r. J. h. Jenkins, Washington D.C. 
1967, 13. 96, p. 70, 31. 40, p. 148; Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Three Treatises on Imperial 
Military Expeditions, ed. J. F. haldon, [CFHB, vol. 28], Vienna 1990, pp. 118-9; The Taktika 
of Leo VI, text, translation and commentary by G. T. dennis [Dumbarton Oaks Texts 12], 
Washington DC, 2010, XVI. 54, XVIII. 212, 365, 620, XX. 290, 305, 379, 385, 456, 801; 
The Anonymous Book on Tactics, in: Three Byzantine Military Treatises, tr. G. T. dennis, 
Washington 1985/latest edition 2008, 18, p. 292; Presentation and Composition on Warfare 
of the Emperor Nicephoros, in: Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth 
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during the following period of the Epigonoi of the Macedonian dynasty 
(1025-56) that we begin to observe a slight change in terminology by 
chroniclers, who are using the term μισθοφόροι instead, thus indicating a 
period of change in the way the Empire was recruiting its mercenaries3. But 
what was the difference between these large units of foreign mercenaries and 
the westerners that first appeared in the Imperial Court in the second half 
of the eleventh century?
The troops that had been employed by the Byzantine Empire to cover 
its needs for large quantities of soldiers were supplied, primarily, by states 
like Armenia and the neighbouring principalities of the Caucasus, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and kiev. These were not only neighbouring countries, but in many 
cases were either in cordial relations with Constantinople or were depended 
upon their trading agreements or were simply satellite or vassal states. And 
in order to raise these sizeable enough units, Constantinople had to have the 
permission and active cooperation of their respective lords or overlords. 
If we examine the case of the Byzantine expedition in sicily in 1038, 
when 300 mounted Normans took part in that campaign sent by Gaimar of 
salerno, a suzerain of the Normans of Aversa and a vassal of the Empire4. 
The example of the Normans fits in the already established pattern of 
the Byzantines employing large units of mercenary soldiers to cover their 
occasional need for troops, thus marking the first case of a “Frankish” unit 
being employed by a Byzantine expeditionary force. However, these Frankish 
troops that first arrived in the mid-eleventh century, although they should 
have been receiving a fixed pay (ρόγα – σιτηρέσιον), their main difference 
was that they were employed as individuals – materialistic volunteers who 
had travelled long-way in search for sufficient pay and the opportunity to 
pillage and destroy, literally matching the term “soldiers of fortune”. Further, 
the contingents of troops provided by the aforementioned states were serving 
Century, tr. and ed. by e. McGeer, Washington 1995, I. 52, p. 14; J.-a. de FoucaulT, Douze 
chapitres inedits de la tactique de Nicephore Ouranos, TM 5 (1973) 308-9; Cecaumenus, 
Strategicon, ed. B. WassilieWsky – V. JernsTedT, st. Petersburg 1896, 95; Nicephori Bryennii, 
Historiarum Libri Quattuor, ed. p. GauTier [CFHB, vol. 9], Brussels, 1975, 91, 259, 265, 27.
3. The use of μισθοφόρος as “wage-receivers” is first seen in the work of skylitzes 
who uses it along with the older terms σύμμαχοι and ἐθνικοί. see the detailed analysis by: 
J. shepard, The Uses of the Franks in Eleventh-Century Byzantium, Anglo-Norman Studies 
15 (1993), 280-1. 
4. An analysis of this campaign, along with bibliography, can be found in p. 140. 
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the Emperor for a limited number of campaigns, and maybe even a single 
campaign, while a large number of Franks served under Imperial generals 
for many decades, either for or against the Emperor. Thus, the 300 Normans 
of the 1038 campaign, although they were sent by Gaimar of salerno who 
was a vassal of Byzantium, they were not their native subjects and they 
were serving George Maniaces under their own leaders, namely William 
and Drogo Hauteville. A significant number of them were still referred to as 
“Maniakatoi” by Anna Comnena in 10785, serving the rebel dux Nicephorus 
Bryennius at the battle of kalavryai against the Imperial army.
But even before the first appearance of Franks as individual mercenaries 
in the service of the Byzantine Emperors in the mid-1040s, troops from 
Russia had already left their mark in the Byzantine army and society, mostly 
due to the famous regiment of the Varangians which was in the personal 
service of the Byzantine Emperors. A number of studies have been published 
on these two types of mercenaries, the Varangians and the Franks, and I 
owe to mention two of them which served me as guides through the writing 
of this paper. Regarding the Varangians in Byzantine service, a great study 
is sigfus Blöndal’s The Varangians of Byzantium, translated and revised by 
Benedikt Benedikz, which offers a magnificent insight into the mysterious 
world of these warriors through the examination of Greek, Latin, Rus, Arabic, 
Armenian and, most significantly, scandinavian and Icelandic sagas6. For 
the establishment of Frankish mercenaries in the Byzantine Empire and the 
career of their officers in the period 1040s-80s, the classic study of “The 
Uses of the Franks in Eleventh-Century Byzantium” by Jonathan shepard is 
of great value to any historian of the period7.
However, no study has attempted to examine these significantly 
different mercenary groups and compare their fighting tactics with those of 
their enemies on each of the two major operational theatres of the Byzantine 
5. Annae Comnenae Alexias, (2 vols.), ed. D. R. reinsch – a. kaMBylis [CFHB, vol. 
40], Berlin 2001, I. v, 21-22. 
6. s. Blöndal, The Varangians of Byzantium, tr. and ed. by B. Benedikz, Cambridge 
1978 (latest edition, 2007); I did not have the chance to go through: WladyslaW duczko, 
Viking Rus: Studies on the Presence of Scandinavians in Eastern Europe, Leiden 2004.
7. shepard, The Uses of the Franks, 275-307; see also: J. -c. cheyneT, “Le Role des 
Occidentaux dans l’Armée Byzantin avant la Premiére Croisade”, in: Byzanz und das 
Abendland im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert, ed. e. konsTanTinou, köln 1997, 111-28.
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Empire, the Balkans and Asia Minor. Thus, not structuring my analysis on a 
chronological basis but rather on the different enemies that these mercenaries 
were facing in different geographical conditions, the main objective of my 
research is to give answers to a series of questions; what evidence do we have 
about the organisation of the mercenary units of the Rus, the Varangians and 
the Franks and in what numbers were they descending at Constantinople? 
What were the political circumstances that led to their employment by the 
Emperors throughout our period of study? What was their standing in the 
Byzantine military establishment? Did they pose any threat to the central 
government? What evidence do we have about their battle and siege tactics 
and their overall role in each operational theatre?
The formal date for the introduction of the Varangian Guard to the 
Byzantine military establishment is widely considered to be the year 9888. In 
that year, the Emperor Basil II was faced with the one of the most challenging 
tasks of his reign which was the suppression of a rebellion led by two of the 
most powerful families of Asia Minor, the Phokades and the skleroi9. With 
the rebel armies marching against him and in a desperate need for troops he 
turned to Prince Vladimir of kiev, who agreed to send him 6,000 elite troops 
in exchange for the hand of a πορφυρογέννητη princess, Basil’s sister Anna. 
But even before the arrival of the Varangians, swedish warriors from Russia 
had already left their mark in the Empire for more than a century. The 
earliest surviving records that indicate a swedish-Russian presence in the 
Constantinopolitan court dates back to the reign of Theophilus (829-42), 
when “a Rus ambassador” participated in an embassy sent by the Emperor 
to Louis the Pious on 18th May 83910. It is reasonable to think that these 
8. G. osTroGorsky, History of the Byzantine State, Oxford 1989, 304; a. a. VasilieV, 
History of the Byzantine Empire, (2 vols.), Madison, 1928-29, I, 392; M. anGold, The 
Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204, London 1997, 25.
9. c. holMes, Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976-1025), Oxford 2005, 
240-99; eadeM, Political Elites in the Reign of Basil II, in: Byzantium in the Year 1000, ed. p. 
MaGdalino, Leiden 2003, 35-69, especially 44-56; J.-c. cheyneT, The Byzantine Aristocracy, 
(8th-13th c.), in: The Byzantine Aristocracy and its Military Function, ed. J.-c. cheyneT, 
Ashgate-Variorum 2006, 281-322.
10. Annales Bertiniani [MGΗ. scriptores 5], ed. G. WaiTz, Hannover 1883, vol. 20, 434; 
for a translation into English: The Annals of St-Bertin, tr. J. l. nelson, Manchester 1991, 
44. see also A. V. riasanoVsky, The Embassy of 838 revisited: some Comments in connection 
with a “Normanist”source on Early Russian History, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 
10 (1962), 1-12.
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particular emissaries must have been sent by a swedish-Russian ruler in an 
attempt to seal a trading deal, but unfortunately the sources are not clear at 
this point.  
What might have brought the swedish-Rus11 warriors in close contact 
with the Byzantines would have been the raids of their chieftains during 
the previous decade that threatened the archondate of Cherson, in the 
north coasts of the Black sea, and it is implied that the root cause for the 
unsettled situation in the north was indeed the Rus from southern Russia12. 
However, it is widely believed that the official date for the establishment 
of firm relations between Byzantium and the Rus was the year 860 which 
marks their first siege of Constantinople. In its aftermath, we find treaties 
being drawn between Michael III and the Russians in the years 866 and 
868 where it is clearly noted that troops should be sent to the Emperor’s 
personal service13. 
For the following decades the relations between the Rus and Byzantium 
remained mostly cordial, though it is important to mention one of the terms 
of the Russian - Byzantine treaty of september 911, which followed the 
Russian siege of Constantinople in 907, that “Whenever you [Byzantines] 
find it neccessary to declare war, or when you are conducting a campaign, 
11. The Russians were an amalgamation of scandinavian � mainly swedish � settlers 
and slavic and Finno-Ugrian nomads. From now on only the term Rus will be used, mainly 
as a geographical term that will include Russians of both slavic and scandinavian origin, 
unless specified otherwise. For more on the debate concerning the origin of the ninth and 
tenth century Rus: G. Vernadsky, The Origins of Russia, Oxford 1959, 198-201; Blöndal, 
The Varangians of Byzantium, 1-14; h. r. e. daVidson, The Viking Road to Byzantium, 
London 1976, 57-67. a. carile, Byzantine Political Ideology and the Rus’ in the tenth-twelfth 
centuries, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 12/13, Proceedings of the International Congress 
commemorating the Millenium of Christianity in Rus’- Ukraine (1988/1989), 400-413.
12. De administrando imperio, 42. 76-78, p. 186. This issue has been largely debated in: 
a. a. VasilieV, The Goths in the Crimea, Cambridge Mass. 1936, 108 ff; J. B. Bury, A History 
of the Eastern Roman Empire, from the fall of Irene to the accession of Basil I, London 1912, 
417-8; d. oBolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, London 1971, 175-6; s. Franklin – J. 
shepard, The Emergence of Rus, London 1996, 85.
13. Anecdota Bruxellensia I, Chroniques byzantines du Manuscrit 11376, ed. F. 
cuMonT (1894), 33-4. This chronicle was compiled in the eleventh century and we have to be 
cautious about the information we derive from it. For a much detailed study and an extensive 
literature: a. a. VasilieV, The Russian attack on Constantinople in 860, Cambridge Mass. 
1946. 
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providing any Rus desirous of honouring your Emperor come at any time 
and wish to remain in his service, they shall be permitted in this respect to 
act according to their desire”14. This Russian-Byzantine treaty of 911 was 
further developed to a treaty of friendship and alliance after the Russian 
siege of Constantinople in 941 and the peace-treaty of 944, signed after 
Prince Igor’s show of power in the Danube in 943. In that treaty of 944, 
we read: “And if our [Byzantine] Empire needs military assistance from 
you against our adversaries, we shall write to you Great Prince [Igor], and 
he shall send us as many troops as we require. And so other nations shall 
learn what amity the Greeks and the Rus entertain toward each other”15. 
The importance of these aforementioned treaties, along with the one which 
ended the 971 campaign by svyatoslav in the lower Danube and simply 
confirmed the previous one of 94116, and the gradual conversion of the 
kievan Russians to Christianity in the same period17 ,were fundamental for 
the Rus who wished to serve as professional soldiers in the Imperial Army. 
Especially after 944 they had ample opportunities to do so.
The most important operational theatre of the Empire through the 
period of the “Reconquest” was, undoubtedly, Cilicia and syria. In Egypt 
there were the Ikhshidites, nominal masters of syria as well, who were ousted 
by the Fatimids of Ifriqiya in 969. In the meantime, the Hamdanid dynasty 
had established itself at Mosul and Aleppo, in 944/5, staying in power until 
14. Povest Vremennykh Let, ed. V. p.adriannoVa-pereTTs, Moscow and Leningrad, 
1950, cols. 29-36; The Russian Primary Chronicle, Laurentian Text, tr. and ed. by s. h. 
cross – o. p. sherBoWiTz-WeTzor, Cambridge Mass. 1953, 64-68; see also: G. osTroGorsky, 
L’Expedition du Prince Oleg contre Constantinople en 907, Annales de l’Institut Kondakov 
11 (1939), 47-62; a. a. VasilieV, The second Russian Attack on Constantinople, DOP 6 
(1951), 161-225; for a detailed study of the Russian-Byzantine treaties of  911, 944 and 971, 
see: s. Mikuchi, Etudes sur la diplomatique russe la plus ancienne, krakow 1953; J. shepard, 
some problems of Russo-byzantine relations c. 860-c. 1050, The Slavonic and East European 
Review 52 (1974), 10-33; J. MalinGoudi, Die russisch-byzantinischen Verträge des 10. Jhds. 
aus diplomatischer Sicht, Thessaloniki 1994.
15. Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 45-54; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 72-77.
16. Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 72-74; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 89-90
17. The famous visit of Princess Olga to Constantinople, in 957, and her conversion to 
Christianity. The Primary Chronicle talks about an agreement made between Constantine 
VII and Olga before her departure for kiev: “You [Olga] promised me that on your return to 
Rus’ you would send me many presents of slaves, wax, and furs, and despatch soldiery to aid 
me”. Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 62-63; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 83.
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the Byzantine conquest of Antioch in 969, being reduced to a vassal state 
after that. The Arab armies18, consisted primarily of two categories of troops; 
first, we had the regular troops – the professionals, the conscripts and the 
volunteers (ghazis), with large numbers of Bedouin and sudanese auxiliary 
units (abid); also, we had the foreign mercenaries � specialists who performed 
particular roles in battle, primarily infantry units of Iranian Daylami, along 
with kurds and steppe Turkish and khorasanian cavalry of slave-soldiers 
(ghulam mamluk)19. The battle tactics and equipment of the Arabs were 
very similar to those of the Byzantines, revealing the great influence of the 
Eastern Roman Empire upon them throughout the centuries, meaning they 
were fighting on horseback at full gallop and in closed formation intending 
to deliver a heavy blow rather than encircle and harass the enemy20. However, 
we have to note that certain units of the Arab armies were fighting in a 
similar way with that of the seljuks, more specifically the Berber auxiliary 
units armed with a lance, with Nicephoros Phocas devoting much attention 
to them in his Praecepta Militaria21. 
In this period that began with the abortive expedition against the 
Umayyad Muslims of Crete in 949, some 629 Rus participated in the 
18. For the best accounts on the organisation, consistency and battle tactics employed 
by the Hamdanids and Fatimids: e. McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, 225-46; c. W. c. 
oMan, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages AD 378-1485, (2 vols.), London 
1924 (latest edition: 1991), I, 208-16; B. J. Beshir, Fatimid Military Organization, Der Islam 
55 (1978), 37-56; W. J. haMBlin, The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades, PhD thesis, 
University of Michigan 1985; y. leV, Infantry in Muslim armies during the Crusades, in: 
Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, ed. J. h. pryor, Ashgate 2006, 185-206.
19. In contrast to the vast numbers of mounted archers that the seljuks could put in 
the field, this element was not as dominant in the Aghlabid, Tulunid, Ikhshidite � and later 
the Fatimid � and the Hamdanid armies: J. l. Bacharach, African Military slaves in the 
Medieval Middle East: The Cases of Iraq (869-955) and Egypt (868-1171), International 
Journal of Middle East Studies [13. 4 (1981)], 478-80; haMBlin, 85-7; y. leV, Regime, Army 
and society in Medieval Egypt, 9th-12th Centuries, in: War and Society in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries, ed. y. leV, Leiden 1997, 120-22, 129.
20. Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 110, 114; see also: T. G. kolias, The Taktika of Leo VI and 
the Arabs, Graeco-arabica 3 (1984), 129-35.
21. They are identified as the Arabitai (Ἀραβίται) and they were the main reason for 
the adding of the third line of horsemen in the Byzantine cavalry formations of the tenth 
century: Praecepta Militaria, II. 101-110, p. 28.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:08:50 |
GEORGIOs THEOTOkIs
BYZANTINA sYMMEIkTA 22 (2012) 125-156
132
campaign which was sent by Constantine VII22, while we also know that 
about 700 Rus had already been employed by Leo VI in his Cretan expedition 
against the Arabs in 912, being paid 7,200 nomismata23. Five years after 
the second failed expedition against Crete, in 954, Bardas Phocas � the 
Domestic of the scholae � is said to have brought a number of Rus with him 
in northern Mesopotamia in his campaigns against the Emir of Aleppo 
saif-ad-Daulah24. The campaigns in Upper Mesopotamia can be traced 
back almost continuously since the early 930s, conducted under the brilliant 
generalship of John Curcuas, the same general who was summoned to deliver 
the capital from the danger of the Russian invasion of Bithynia in 94125. Did 
he personally introduce a number of Russians into the units of his army? 
We cannot say with certainty but it is quite possible. Whatever the case, a 
number of Rus and Bulgarian soldiers had been active in Mesopotamia and 
Armenia since the Byzantine campaigns of 94726. It would have been very 
interesting, indeed, if we were able to reconstruct the Rus fighting tactics 
primarily against the infantry of the Iranian Daylami under the command 
of the Hamdanids of Aleppo. The latter had very similar equipment with the 
Rus, meaning large battle-axes and swords, accompanied with two-pronged 
spears (zupin or mizraq). Their ethnic background made them excellent 
22. Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, De Cerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae, [CsHB, 5-6], ed. 
i. reiske – e. WeBer, Bonn 1829-30, I, 664ff.; a.a VasilieV, Byzance et les Arabes, 867-959, 
(4 vols.), Brussels 1968, II, p. 334. Most likely a part of them would have participated in 
the Byzantine reinforcements sent to Italy in 934/5. Constantine VII writes about 415 Rus 
being transported by 11 chelandia. see: De Cerimoniis, I, 660; J. Gay, L’ Italie meridionale 
et l’Empire Byzantine depuis l’avenement de Basile Ier jusqu’a la prise de Bari par les 
Normands (867-1071), (2 vols.), Paris 1904, I, 210; J. h. pryor – e. M. JeFFreys, The Age of 
the Δρόμων, the Byzantine Navy ca 500-1204, Boston 2006, 189.
23. De Cerimoniis, I, 654; for the conquest of Crete by the Arabs: V. chrisTides, The 
conquest of Crete by the Arabs (ca. 824): a turning point in the struggle between Byzantium 
and Islam, Athens 1984, 157ff.; d. TsouGarakes, Byzantine Crete from the 5th century to the 
Venetian Conquest, Athens 1988; c. Makrypoulias, The Navy in the Works of Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus, Institute for Graeco-Oriental and African Studies 6 (1995), 1-19. 
24. Mutanabbi, Poem on Hadath, in: Byzance et les Arabes, 867-959, ed. A. A. VasilieV 
and trans. M. canard, Brussels 1950, vol. 2.II, 331; canard, M., Histoire de la Dynastie des 
Hamdanides de Jazira et de Syrie, Alger 1951, 779. 
25. ODB, (3 vols.), ed. by a. p. kazhdan, New York 1991, II, 1156-57; osTroGorsky, 
History of the Byzantine State, 277.
26. a. raMBaud, L’Empire grec au Xe siècle: Constantin Porphyrogénnète, Paris 1870, 
425.
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fighters in mountainous and broken terrain where the cavalry could not 
operate, with the Taurus Mountains of Cilicia and the broken terrain in 
syria being the perfect battle-ground for them, thus we pressume they would 
have met with the Rus in battle at some point27.
In the third and final expedition against the Cretan Arabs commanded 
by Nicephoros Phocas in 960/1, the elite unit that preceded the rest of the 
invading army and broke through the coastal defences of the Arabs probably 
consisted of an unknown number of Rus28, most likely foot-soldiers judging 
by the nature of their mission, and it is reasonable to believe that these elite 
and battle-hardened troops would have been of much use to Nicephorus II 
against Aleppo in 962. According to Leo the Deacon, during the early years 
of Nicephorus’ reign, a number of Rus is mentioned to have taken part in an 
expedition launched against the kalbite Muslims of sicily, in 964-5, which 
resulted to a complete failure for the Imperial forces at Rametta29. Next year, 
however, the Imperial fleet managed to capture Cyprus from the Arabs, 
and although no reference is made by the chroniclers, it is quite likely that 
Russian troops would have taken part in that expedition as well.
so far, the cardinal distinction between the aforementioned troops and 
those in the Varangian Guard after the year 988 was that the former were 
employed as individuals, and although they had even managed to penetrate 
into the tagmatic unit of the ἑταιρεία already since the years of Michael 
III30, they never formed a separate and distinct unit like the Varangians. It 
seems that these Russian troops were primarily infantry units, basing our 
conclusions mainly on the nature of their missions and upon considering 
that in all the cases when they arrived outside the walls of Constantinople 
27. For the Daylami: McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, 233-6; c. e. BosWorTh, 
Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq, Oriens 18 (1965-66), 149-51. 
28. Leonis diaconi, De Velitatione bellica Nicephori augusti, ed. C. B. Hase, [CsHB, 4], 
Bonn 1828, 7-18, 24-8; The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine military expansion in the 
tenth century, tr. by a. M. TalBoT, Washington D.C. 2005, 60-9, 76-9.
29. Leo the Deacon, 65-8; The History of Leo the Deacon, 115-7; Ibn-el-Athir, Kamil 
fit-ta ta’rih, tr. M. canard, in: Byzance et les Arabes, 867-959, ed. a. a. VasilieV, 160-1; 
Liutprand of Cremona, The Works of Liutprand of Cremona, Antapodosis, Liber de Rebus 
Gestis Ottonis, Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana, trans. with and introduction by 
F. A. WriGhT, London 1930, p. 261; see also: G. l. schluMBerGer, Un empereur byzantin au 
dixième siècle, Nicéphore Phocas, Paris 1890, 447-9; M. aMari, Storia dei Musulmani di 
Sicilia, (3 vols.), Catania 1935, v. II, 304-15. 
30. De Cerimoniis, 579, 682; schluMBerGer, Nicéphore Phocas, 295.
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they had been transported by their famous μονόξυλα (“single-strakers”), 
relatively small wooden vessels with low hull that could hardly have had 
space for the transportation of horses. Leo the Deacon, who describes 
svyatoslav’s Danube expedition of 969-71, gives us a description of the Rus 
warriors’ defensive formations: “They [Rus] quickly seized their weapons and 
shouldered their shields that reached to their feet31, and drew up into a strong 
close formation and advanced against the Romans. since the scythians [Rus] 
were on foot (for they are not accustomed to fight from horseback, since 
they are not trained for this), they were not able to withstand the spears 
of the Romans”32. But even when the chroniclers talk about the Rus setting 
out against “Tsargrad” by horse and boat, it is much more likely that they 
hired mercenary troops, like they did with the Patzinaks, the Varangians 
from sweden and other Turkic nomads in 907, 944 and 97133. Finally, 
an interesting note is written by the Emperor Nicephoros Phocas in his 
Praecepta militaria, where the javeliners who constituted a fifth of a typical 
1000-man infantry drungus (or taxiarchy) of the period were “either Ros or 
other foreigners”34, while the late tenth century treatise On Tactics mentions 
these troops forming elite units of heavily armed infantry, probably spear 
men or javeliners35, escorting the Emperor and performing special duties 
during the campaign.
31. Ποδηνεκεῖς θυρεούς: Leo the Deacon, pp. 133, 144; The History of Leo the Deacon, 
pp. 180, 188. Compare the shape of the shield with the Viking and Norman ones of the 
period: J. k. siddorn, Viking Weapons & Warfare, stroud 2003, 39-60; an excellent analysis 
of the Byzantine shield can be found in: T. G. kolias, Byzantinische Waffen. Ein Beitrag 
zur byzantinischen Waffenkunde von den Anfängen bis zur lateinischen Eroberung [BV 17] 
Vienna 1988, 88-133.
32. Leo the Deacon, pp. 133-4, 143; The History of Leo the Deacon, p. 180, 188.
33. Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 22, 29, 44; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 60, 64, 71-2; 
Joannes scylitzes, Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis historiarum, ed. i. Thurn, [CFHB, Berlin 1973], 
I, 288; Leo the Deacon, p. 108. This practice eclipsed by the coming of the eleventh century. 
see: B. GrekoV, Kiev Rus, Moscow 1959, 461-71; G. Vernadsky, The Origins of Russia, 257, 
265.
34. εἰ μὲν εἰσίν ἀκοντισταί, εἴτε Ρῶς εἴτ’ ἕτεροι ἐθνικοί: Praecepta Militaria, I. 52, p. 
14.
35. The text reads: “Let him [the Emperor] also have some Rus and malartioi.” Malartioi, 
according to Dennis were later (11th century) referred to as κονταράτοι (spearmen). Thus 
the Rus would probably have belonged to the same category or perhaps, javeliners: “On 
Tactics”, 10. 37-40, p. 280; 19. 35, p. 294.
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A new era, however, for the mercenary forces employed by the Byzantines 
began in the late 980s with the coming of the scandinavian regiment of the 
Varangians in Constantinople. We read in Psellus’ description of their arrival: 
“The Emperor Basil was well aware of the disloyalty of the Romans, but not 
long before this a picked band of scythians had come to help him from the 
Taurus. These men, fine fighters, he had trained in separate corps and put 
them in a division with other foreign troops, and sent them out against the 
enemy”36. The fact that this unit was mixed with other mercenaries, bearing 
in mind that the Byzantines used to keep the units, both indigenous and 
foreign, ethnically and geographically coherent, makes us think that this 
core of 6,000 men would have been increased with existing troops from 
Russia, of either slavic or scandinavian origin37, already in service. And 
by the time the Varangians arrived in the capital and won their first battle 
against the rebels at Abydos (13th April 989), they immediately replaced 
the Excubitai38 as the personal guard of the Emperor. In addition, they 
were divided into the “Varangians of the City” (οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Βάραγγοι), 
who guarded the Emperor and escorted him in his tours, either within the 
36. Although we have to bear in mind that Psellus cannot be taken as an authority in 
military matters: The History of Psellus, edited with critical notes by C. saThas, London 1899, 
7-8, from now on: Psellus; M. Psellus, Fourteen Byzantine rulers: the ‘Chronographia’ of Michael 
Psellus, tr. E. R. A. seWTer, London 1966, I, 13-15, pp. 34-5, from now on: Chronographia. 
For the documentation of the arrival of the Varangian regiment, see also: skylitzes, II, 444; 
Ioannis Zonaras, Annales [CsHB, 41], 42.1, 42.2, Bonn 1841-97, III, 553; for an edition into 
modern Greek: Ιωάννης Ζωναράς, Επιτομή Ιστοριών, μτφ. Ι. ΓρηΓοριάδης, Αθήνα 1995-99; 
Asochik, Histoire Universelle, tr. e. dulaurier – F. Macler, Paris 1883-1917, II, 164-5; 
Yahya-ibn-said Antaki, Histoire de Yahya-ibn-Sa’īd d’Antioche, continuateur de Sa’īd-ibn-
Bitriq, ed. and tr. I. krachkoVskii – a. a.VasilieV, Paris 1932-57, Patrologia Orientalis, t. 18, 
fasc. 5, 425-6.
37. Whether these troops before the 980s were of slavic or scandinavian origin is 
debatable. Even if the newly arrived scandinavian Varangians were reinforced by existing 
forces of “scythians”, we must remember that the Byzantine chroniclers used this term to 
describe all the Rus, both of slavic and scandinavian origin. see: Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 
29; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 64.
38. Elite unit of Constantinopolitan noblemen who were responsible for the defence of 
the Imperial Palace. They should not be confused with the men of the Etaireia who formed 
the Emperor’s life-guard. see: J. B. Bury, The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth 
Century, London 1911, 57-60; H. J. kühn, Die byzantinische Armee im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert: 
Studien zur Organisation der Tagmata, Wien 1991, 93-104; a. chrisTophilopoulou, Βυζαντινὴ 
Ἱστορία, Thessaloniki 21997, II, 335; Blöndal, The Varangians of Byzantium, 18-21.
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capital or in his campaigns, and the “Varangians outside the City” (οἱ ἔξω 
τῆς πόλεως Βάραγγοι) who were stationed in key posts in the provinces39. 
In fact, it is worth quoting a letter found in the Primary Chronicle, allegedly 
sent from prince Vladimir to Basil II: “Varangians are on their way to your 
country. Do not keep many of them in your city, or else they will cause 
you such harm as they have done here. scatter them therefore in various 
localities, and do not let a single one return this way”40.
This elite regiment of fighters would certainly have accompanied Basil II 
in his series of campaigns, both in the East and in the Balkans. In the syrian 
expedition of 999, when Basil II was called to restore order in the region after 
the duke of Antioch’s defeat by the Fatimids the year before, the Emperor 
besieged and captured Raphanea and Emesa. According to the History of 
the Muslim chronicler Yahia-ibn-said, an unknown number of Varangians 
was used in the operations, with their presence being made known by their 
burning of a church where people had taken refuge41. The same army that 
left Cilicia and syria can be found in Armenia in the following year, when 
an Armenian chronicler notes the presence of the Varangian regiment, 
clearly foot soldiers that used horses for transportation, in full-strength in 
the Armenian palace42.
Regarding the Empire’s Balkan struggle against the Bulgarians in Basil 
II’s reign, although the great Byzantine general Nicephorus Ouranos had 
inflicted a serious blow to them in 997, it was only after the Emperor’s 
return to Constantinople in 1001 that the great counter-offensive began43. In 
39. Blöndal, The Varangians of Byzantium, 45.
40. Povest Vremennykh Let, i. 79; The Russian Primary Chronicle, 93; the chronicler 
erroneously copies this letter under the year 980.
41. Yahya-ibn-said Antaki, Histoire de Yahya-ibn-Sa’īd d’Antioche, continuateur 
de Said-ibn-Bitriq, ed. and tr. I. krachkoVskii – a. a. VasilieV, Paris 1932- 57, Patrologia 
Orientalis, t. 23, fasc. 3, 458; G. schluMBerGer, L’épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle, 
(2 vols.), Paris 1896-1905, II, 152-3; B. s. Benedikz, The Evolution of the Varangian Regiment 
in the Byzantine Army, BZ 62 (1969), 24.
42. Asochik, Histoire Universelle, 165; Aristakès de Lastivert, Récit des Malheurs 
de la Nation Arménienne, trans. with introduction and commentary by M. canard – H. 
BerBérian, Brussels 1973, 4.
43. P. M. sTrässle, Krieg und Kriegführung in Byzanz: Die Kriege Kaiser Basileios II. 
gegen die Bulgaren (976-1019), köln 2006, 296-301; J.-c. cheyneT, “La politique militaire 
byzantine de Basile II à Alexis Comnène”, ZRVI 29-30 (1991), 61-74, especially 61-64; p. 
sTephenson, The legend of Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, Cambridge 2003, 11-49; ideM, Byzantium’s 
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an attempt to cut Tsar samuel off from his traditional Bulgarian territories 
of the lower Danube, Basil conducted a series of campaigns44, sometimes 
taking place throughout the year, attacking sardica and advancing towards 
Pliska (the former Bulgarian capital) and both the Great and Little Preslav. 
The two major battles he fought and won over samuel took place in 1004, not 
far from skopje, and ten years later he nearly reached his goal of pacifying 
the Bulgars in the famous battle at the kleidion Pass (29th July 1014)45. 
Although no detailed mentioning is made by our contemporary sources46, 
it is almost certain that throughout this period Basil would have used his 
elite Varangians to sweep off any Bulgarian elements from Macedonia, 
Thessaly and the areas of Great and Little Preslav. It would be fascinating 
to be able to reconstruct their fighting tactics in the mountainous regions 
of Macedonia and Bulgaria against the infantry forces that the Bulgarians 
were able to put to the field and see whether they were used as elite units 
like in syria or Crete. 
To understand the military tactics employed by the Bulgars from the 
late eighth until the early eleventh centuries we need to examine two factors; 
their ethnic background and the geography of the Balkan Peninsula. The 
Onogur-Bulgars47 were a Turkish tribe that by the late ninth century it 
would have been classified to the group of nations which Leo VI identifies 
Balkan frontier: a political study of the northern Balkans, 900-1204, Cambridge 2000, 47-80. 
Although the author’s ground-breaking opinions should be viewed with some caution; J. V. a 
Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans, Ann Arbor Michigan 2008, 188-200.
44. This is the old established view of Basil marching against the Bulgars every year. see: 
skylitzes, I, p. 348. sTephenson argues that skylitzes’ comments are exaggerated: sTephenson, 
The Legend of Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, pp. 21ff; Byzantium’s Balkan frontier, 66-79.
45. J. haldon, The Byzantine Wars, stroud 2001, 107-8.
46. skylitzes, I, 348-51.
47. �n the origins of the Bulgars: d.M. lanG, The Bulgarians, From Pagan Times to 
the Ottoman Conquest, southampton 1976, 21-92; ΕυάΓΓΕλος Κ. ΚυριάΚης, Βυζάντιο και 
Βούλγαροι, 7ος-10ος αι.: συμβολή στην εξωτερική πολιτική του Βυζαντίου, Αθήνα 1993; 
i. kaFesoGlu, Origins of Bulgars, Ankara 1986; G. Feher, Culture of Turco bulgars, Magyars 
and other peoples akin to them: Impact of Turkish culture on Europe, Ankara 1986:  M. 
WhiTToW, The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, London 1996, 262-98; the most recent study 
is: E. N. luTTWak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, London 2009, 171-96;  Γ. 
Κάρδάράς, Η Πολεμική Τέχνη των Πρώιμων Σλάβων (Στ΄-Ζ΄αι.), Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα 18 
(2008), 185-205.
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as the scythian tribes � the Magyars, the Patzinaks and the Bulgars48. They 
were largely a nomadic nation of light horsemen armed mainly with spears 
and bows, with their fighting tactics being very similar to the Turkish ones49. 
The Balkans present a very rugged and fragmented landscape, with few 
major fertile plains in Thessaly, Thrace and the Danube area and around 
two thirds of the peninsula are covered with high mountains50. Thus, in 
order to successfully deal with the Byzantine army, and especially the heavy 
tagmatic cavalry, the Bulgars had to take advantage of the terrain, and in 
many occasions that was exactly what they did by either trying to lure the 
Byzantine units deep into hostile territory and trap them by blocking the 
mountain roads and passes with fell timber51, like Pliska (811), Anchialos 
(917) and kleidion (1014)52, or simply trying to avoid any pitched battle, like 
samuel between 997-101453. 
In the period following the death of Basil II, a key date concerning the 
leadership of the Varangian Guard was the year 103454, when the younger 
half-brother of the Norwegian king Olaf II and future king Harald III 
48. Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 42-73.
49. Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, p. 206-7.
50. Read about Nicephorus Phocas’ brief foray into Bulgaria in 968: Leo the Deacon, 
pp. 62-3; The History of Leo the Deacon, p. 111. For an examination of the geography of 
the Balkans: Ευςτράτιά ςυΓΚΕλλου, Ο Πόλεμος στον Δυτικό Ελλαδικό Xώρο κατά τον 
Yστερο Mεσαίωνα (13ος-15ος αι.), Αθήνα 2008, 43-101; sTrässle, Krieg und Kriegführung 
in Byzanz, 148-214; J. koder, Der Lebensraum der Byzantiner, Wien 1984 (latest edition: 
2001), especially 20-42; M. WhiTToW, The Political Geography of the Byzantine World � 
Geographical survey, in: The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, ed. e. JeFFreys – J. F. 
haldon – r. corMack, Oxford 2008, 219-31; haldon, Warfare, State and Society, 46-66.
51. Leo the Deacon, pp. 105, 130-3; The History of Leo the Deacon, pp. 154-5, 176-9; 
Another factor that needs to be considered seriously is the condition of the roads and paths 
through the mountains and plains: J. haldon, Roads and communications in the Byzantine 
Empire: wagons, horses, and supplies, in: Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, ed. 
J. h. pryor, Ashgate 2006, 131-58, especially 136-44. 
52. For the use of fell timber by the Bulgars to block mountainous roads and passes: 
Ἀνωνύμου Βιβλίον Τακτικόν, in: Three Byzantine Military Treatises, ed. G. T. dennis, 
Washington D.C. 1985 (latest edition: 2008), 19. 25-32, p. 294; McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s 
Teeth, pp. 342-43.
53. haldon, The Byzantine Wars, pp. 71-6, 87-8, 105-8.
54. J. shepard, A Note on Harold Hardraada: the Date of his Arrival at Byzantium, 
JÖB 12 (1973), 145-50.
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(Hardrada, the “severe”) had made his way from Norway to enter the 
Varangian Guard. From this year onwards, our main primary sources 
consist mainly of numismatic and other archaeological evidence along with 
scandinavian sagas which entail the life stories of Haraldr sigurdarson. 
These, mainly Norwegian and Icelandic, sagas were written some 200 
years after the events had taken place, and although the writers would have 
been aware of the related poems and traditional stories, these can be quite 
misleading on a number of occasions55. According to the sagas, Harald 
and his mercenaries “served on the galleys with the force that went into 
the Grecian sea”56. It sounds reasonable for the Empire to have used these 
experienced mercenaries in policing duties in the Aegean sea57, an area that 
was ravaged by Arab raids in the past centuries, even more so if we consider 
the grand naval strategy that had been taking shape as early as the reign of 
Romanus III (1028-34) and involved the revival of the Imperial Fleet and the 
expulsion of the Muslims from sicily58. However, whether the Varangians 
were used as crews of some sort of privateer ships or they actually manned 
Imperial ships, thus being under the direct command of the δρουγγάριος 
τοῦ πλωίμου, is not made entirely clear by the sources, although the last 
case seems much more likely. Further, it is important to note that in this 
early period Harald was still in command of the “Varangians outside of the 
City”, which probably had its winter quarters in the region of the Thrakesion 
theme59. 
55. k. ciGGaar, Visitors from North-West Europe to Byzantium. Vernacular sources: 
Problems and Perspectives, in: Byzantines and Crusaders in non-Greek Sources, 1025-1204, 
ed. M. WhiTBy, Oxford 2007, 123-55.
56. Heimskrigla, ed. B. adalBJarnson, Reykjavik 1941-51; Chronicle of the Kings of 
Norway (snorri sturluson), ed. s. lainG, (3 vols.), London 1844. The newest edition that I did 
not have the chance to go through is: Heimskrigla, History of the Kings of Norway (Snorri 
Sturluson), ed. by lee M. hollander, Austin Texas 1964 (4th ed.: 2002).
57. “Gyrger [George Maniakes] and Harald went round among all the Greek islands, and 
fought much against the corsairs”: Chronicle, ed. s. lainG, v. III, p. 4. Although, according 
solely to the Heimskringla, the Varangians were active in the coasts of Tunisia as well: 
Heimskringla, III, p. 75; Chronicle, ed. s.lainG, v. III, p. 6.
58. H. ahrWeiler, Byzance et la Mer, Paris 1966, 123; see also: salvatore cosenTino, La 
Flotte Byzantine Face a l’Expansion Musulmane. Aspects d’Histoire Institutionelle et sociale 
(VIIe-Xe siècles), BF 28 (2004), 3-21.
59. skylitzes, I, p. 394.
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The campaign that made Harald’s Varangian Guard famous throughout 
the Empire, however, was their participation in the 1038 campaign against 
the kalbite Muslims of sicily, under the command of George Maniakes60. 
In this campaign a contingent of them, probably around 500 under the 
command of Harald, was sent to Italy to take part in the expulsion of the 
Arabs of sicily along with units from the Balkan mainland and 300 Normans 
from Aversa61. The Heimskringla implies that they were used to man the 
imperial naval squadron sent to patrol the coastline of eastern sicily, while 
it is also highly likely that they were sent to reduce a number of fortified 
sites in the east and south-east of the island62. The fact that they manned 
imperial ships during this campaign is further supported by their role in 
Apulia between the years 1066-68, a very similar operational theatre where 
they patrolled the Apulian coasts and defeated a Norman fleet off Brindisi 
according to contemporary chroniclers. However, it is very regrettable that 
the Heimskringla is our only source concerning the siege-tactics of the 
Varangians in sicily. These were the enforcement of a land-blockade, the 
digging of tunnels to undermine the city-walls, along with “unchivalric” 
tricks employed to win over an unidentified castle63.  
60. A. saVVides, Γεώργιος Μανιάκης. Κατακτήσεις και υπονόμευση στο Βυζάντιο του 
11ου αιώνα, 1030-1043 μ.Χ., Athens 2004. For his presence in Vaspurakan as a Catepan for 
one year (1036-7): G. leVenioTes, Η Πολιτική κατάρρευση του Βυζαντίου στην Ανατολή, 
το ανατολικό σύνορο και η κεντρική Μικρά Ασία κατά το Β’ ήμισυ του 11ου αιώνα, 
DPhil Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki 2007, 189, 493; rodolphe 
Guilland, Titres et Fonctions de l’Empire Byzantin, London 1976, XIII, 10-12.
61. Cecaumenus,  97. Geoffrey Malaterra, De Rebus Gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae 
Comitis et Roberti Guiscardi Ducis Fratris Eius, [Rerum Italicarum scriptores, vol. 5.i], ed. 
l. a. MuraTori, Città di Castello, 1900-. I. 7; Amatus, II. 8, in:L’ystoire de li Normant et la 
Chronique de Robert Viscard par Aime, moine du Mont-Cassin, ed. By M. chaMpollion-
FiGeac, Paris 1835; Gesta, I, 203-6, p. 110; skylitzes mentions 500 men: skylitzes, I, 425. 
62. The Heimskringla tells us about the siege of four unidentified castles: Chronicle, 
ed. s. lainG, v. III, pp. 7-12. Could it be that the two of them were Messina and syracuse, for 
which the rest of our sources talk about? see: Malaterra, 1. 7; Amatus, II. 8, 9; skylitzes also 
mentions the capture of thirteen more cities: skylitzes, I, p. 408. For the course of the campaign: 
aMari, Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia, v. II, pp. 438-55; J. Gay, L’Italie Meridionale et 
l’Empire Byzantine, Paris 1904, 450-54; F. chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande 
en Italie et en Sicile, (2 vols.), Paris 1907, I, 88-96; W. Felix, Byzanz und die islamische Welt 
im früheren 11. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen von 1001 bis 1055, 
Wien 1981, 207ff.
63. Chronicle, ed. s. lainG, v. III, pp. 7-12; see also: h. daVidson, A Viking Road to 
Byzantium, London 1976, 214ff.
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After the failure of the sicilian expedition, the Byzantine forces were 
called to crush a Lombard rebellion in Apulia (1041). Three battles took 
place in that year, more specifically in March (Olivento), May (Ofanto) 
and september (Montepeloso) with the rebel forces consisting of Lombard 
footsoldiers and a few hundred Norman cavalry emerging victorious from 
all three of them64. At Olivento, it is more possible that the rebel Lombard 
army would have been confronted by local militias raised hastily by the 
Catepan of Bari65, but after their initial success, the Catepan Doukeianos 
managed to regroup his scattered forces and offer a second battle at Ofanto, 
on the 4th May. He probably received all the necessary reinforcements from 
sicily66, because now we also find troops from the themes of Opsikion and 
Thrace, along with contingents from the Varangian Guard67. For the third 
and final battle of the year, although Amatus tells us that the new Catepan 
Boioannes had brought with him Varangians from the capital, and William 
of Apulia writes about reinforcements called in from sicily, it is more likely 
that Boioannes had to rely on the forces that his predecessor had gathered 
64. There are a number of excellent studies that deal with the Norman expansion 
in the south, although none of them provide a specifically military analysis: chalandon, 
Domination normande, vol. I; H. TaVianni-carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard 
et la conquete Normande en Italie, Paris 1996; R Βunemann, Robert Guiskard 1015-1085. 
Eine Normanner erobert Süditalien, Cologne 1997; G. A. loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: 
Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest, London 2000. A detailed analysis of the strategy 
and military tactics of the Normans in the “early stages” of their expansion in Italy between 
1018-1068 can be found in: G. TheoTokis, The Campaigns of the Norman Dukes of southern 
Italy and Sicily against Byzantium, in the years between 1071 and 1108 AD, PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow 2010, 154ff.
65. skylitzes does not mention the presence of elite troops at Olivento, while for the next 
battle at Ofanto a few weeks later he specifically talks about troops from the Balkan mainland 
and Varangians: skylitzes, I, p. 426. Amatus of Montecassino notes that Doukeianos’ troops 
were “as weak as women”, meaning that they did not have sufficient military training, thus 
they could not have been troops brought from sicily: Amatus, II, 22. see also: H. hunGer, 
Graeculus Perfidus, Ἰταλὸς ἰταμός, Unione Internazionale degli Istituti di Archeologia, 
storia e storia dell’Arte, Rome 1987.
66. William of Apulia notes that he asked for reinforcements after his second defeat at 
Ofanto, but he is probably wrong: Gesta, I, 310-12, pp. 114-6.
67. skylitzes, I, p. 426. Amatus, II. 22. For the course of the battle: Amatus, II. 23; Gesta, 
I, 297-308, p. 114; Malaterra, 1.10, although Malaterra confuses Ofanto with Montepeloso; 
Chronica monasterii Casinensis, [MGH ss 34], II, 66, pp. 298-301.
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along with newly-recruited Apulian troops as well68. Unfortunately, next to 
nothing is known for the course of this battle and the scarce information we 
get from the chroniclers do not allow us to reconstruct the Guard’s battle-
tactics and its general role among the army’s units69.
For the following period of Constantine IX’s reign (1042-55), the 
Varangians were present in almost every operational theatre in both Asia 
Minor and the Balkans. And it was in this crucial period that the Franks 
first appear as individual mercenaries in the service of the Byzantine 
state in the year 1047, during the revolt of Leo Tornikios. The siege of the 
capital by the latter in september brought to the forefront of the political 
life of the capital a man who was very much known to the Normans in 
Italy. That person was Argyros, son of the former Lombard rebel Melus and 
Catepan of Longobardia between 1042-5, who was recalled to the capital in 
that year or early in 1046 to be given a high rank in the Imperial Court70. 
According to the primary sources, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
his coming to the capital in 1046 would have been combined with a number 
of Norman mercenaries from Italy, while it is also possible that remnants 
from Maniakes’ army would also have ended up in imperial service by the 
mid-1040s71. Coupling these two aforementioned statements, we can see 
that Argyros’ coming to Constantinople in 1046 is highly likely to have 
been combined with a number of Normans from Italy who might have 
thought that Byzantium would have been a more profitable place to offer 
their services. In addition, it is quite possible that another unknown number 
of Normans from Italy might have ended up in the Imperial Court after 
George Maniakes’ failed campaign against the Emperor in 1042, when he 
was escorted by “Romans from Italy and Albanians”, meaning of course 
Greeks from his command in Italy and local soldiers from Illyria.
68. Amatus, II, 24. Gesta, I, 328-30, p. 116. skylitzes is adamant that no reinforcements 
were sent with Boioannes from the mainland, see: skylitzes, I, 426-7. It would be more prudent 
if we believe skylitzes’ account at this point because, as a senior officer of the tagmatic 
armies of the capital (δρουγγάριος τῆς βίγλας), he must have been better informed.
69. Amatus, II, 26; Gesta, I, 373-95, pp. 118-20; Chronic. Casin., II, 66, pp. 298-301.
70. ODB, 165-6. see also: A. Pertusi, “Contributi alla storia dei themi bizantini dell’ 
Italia meridionale”, Atti del 3 congresso internazionale di studi sull’ alto medioevo (1956), 
spoleto 1958, 495-517.
71. skylitzes, I, 439-40; Anonymous Barenses, Chronicon, [RIs, v. 151], s.a. 1047. For 
the remnants of the Maniakes’ army Michaelis Attaliatae, Historia, [CFHB, vol. 50], ed. E. 
Tsolakes, Athens 2011, 15. Psellus, 125; Chronographia, VI. 86-7, pp. 197-8;.
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Indeed, the Norman soldiery would not have gone unnoticed by the 
Emperor, judging by the sending of Argyros back to Bari to seek for the 
recruitment of more Normans72. We also have to mention the embassy sent 
to Duke William of Normandy by the Emperor Constantine IX, probably 
around that period, in an attempt to recruit new Normans “right from the 
source”73. 
In the Balkan theatre both the Franks and the Varangians were called 
to fight off the Patzinak penetration south of the Danube which had taken 
place in the winter of 1046/774. According to Attaliates who was an eye-
witness we do know that a Varangian contingent of unknown numbers 
took part in the 1049 campaign, while the same chronicler also mentions 
a number of Frankish troops being recalled from the Armenian border-
towns of Mantzikert and khliat to man a number of fortresses against the 
Patzinaks during the same year75. But the first major campaign to dislodge 
the Patzinaks took place in the last years of Constantine IX’s reign, in 1052, 
when Byzantine forces penetrated in eastern Bulgaria (towards Preslav) in 
an effort to drive them out. Again we have no idea about the size or the 
consistency of the Byzantine force sent for the task, although it is likely 
that Constantine might have called for the Varangians and the experienced 
western tagmata, aware that he was dealing with very experienced mounted 
soldiers. In fact, skylitzes rights that Constantine Arianites, Domesticus of 
the West, along with Macedonian, Bulgarian and thrakesian soldiers were, 
indeed, mobilised for that campaign76.
Another fundamental change seen in the structure of the mercenary 
Frankish troops employed by the Byzantines after 1049 was that from now 
on they would have their own leader. Hervé or Ἑρβέβιος ὁ Φραγγόπωλος77, 
72. Gesta, II. 55-60, p. 134. 
73. Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiérs, ed. and tr. by R. H. C. daVis and M. chiBnall, 
Oxford 1998, 96-7.
74. J. shepard, John Mauropous, Leo Tornicius and an alleged Russian army: The 
chronology of the Pecheneg crisis of 1048-1049, JÖB 24 (1975), 61-89. 
75. Attaliates, 26-33; Cecaumenos, 22-3.
76. skylitzes, I, 458. We have to bear in mind that in skylitzes’ text the term τάγματα 
means the whole of the troops of a military area.
77. Hervé’s origin has not been established and we may presume that he was either a 
Norman or Frank. Frankopoulos meant, in Greek, “the son of a Frank.”: ODB, vol. I, 922; 
e.M.c Van houTs, Normandy and Byzantium, Byz 55 (1985), 554-5.
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a veteran of Maniakes’ sicilian campaign78, who commanded the left wing of 
the Imperial army against the Patzinak invaders in 1049 under the general 
Catacalon Cecaumenos79. The left wing commanded by Hervé is described 
by skylitzes as the wing of the “Roman phalanx” consisting of mounted 
Frankish mercenaries who were Hervé’s fellow-countrymen80. However, if 
we accept the probability of Hervé’s men being all Franks, their numbers 
should have been quite substantial if they made up an entire wing of the 
Imperial army’s battle-line. Even though Hervé is mentioned to have fled the 
field in disgrace, it is quite likely he returned to fight the Patzinaks a couple 
of years later, although again no specific mentioning of him can be traced 
in our sources81.
During the reign of Constantine X Doukas (1059-68) the Varangians 
were mainly used in the distant province of Longobardia against the 
expanding Norman states82. In 1066, a contingent of them was sent to Bari 
to take the initiative against the Normans in Apulia. They succeeded in 
re-taking Taranto, Brindisi and Castelanetta, with a number of them being 
posted in Brindisi, where they successfully defended it against a Norman 
assault and Otranto83. During this period and until the siege of Bari 
(1068-1071) they were employed in one of their usual tasks, meaning the 
naval patrol of the Apulian coasts84. 
In the eastern provinces of Asia Minor during the same period, a force 
of some 3,000 Varangians took part in the annexation of the Armenian 
kingdom of Ani (1045), in operations that spread from the Byzantine 
78. skylitzes, I, 484.
79. Cecaumenos was a senior army officer, himself a sicilian veteran in the head of 
the Armeniac contingent under the command of Maniakes where he, probably, invested 
Messina. For more on Cecaumenos, see: A. saVVides, The Byzantine Family of kekaumenos 
(Cecaumenus), late 10th-early 12th centuries, Δίπτυχα 4 (1986-87), 12-27.
80. ἄρχοντα τῷ τότε τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν: skylitzes, I, 467-8.
81. Ibid., I, 467-8.
82. loud, Robert Guiscard, 130-137.
83. Anon. Bar., s.a. 1066; chalandon, Domination Normande, I, 183; Gay, Italie 
Meridionale, 535. For the siege of Otranto: Cecaumenus, 30; for a modern Greek edition, see: 
kεκαυμένος, Στρατηγικόν, tr. by D. TsouGarakis, Athens 1996.
84. Lupus Protospatharius Annales [ MGH ss. Vol. 60], s.a 1071; Cecaumenos clearly 
distinguishes between the infantry units of the Rus (κονταράτοι) and the Varangians who 
were marines (πλώιμοι); Cecaumenos, 30. 
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Armenia to Georgia and Abkhazia to the north85, while in the mid-1050s, 
a large unit of Varangians and Normans was called to defend the Imperial 
fortresses � Mantzikert in particular � in Armenia against the seljuk raids, 
with much success86. We know that Hervé had his household in “Armenian 
lands” in the early 1050s, being sent to these areas to defend the Empire’s 
Armenian outposts87. 
As one of the most elite regiments of the Byzantine Army, the 
Varangians played a protagonist role in the coup d’etat of the summer of 
1057, the one that cost Michael VI (1056-57) his throne by the Domesticus 
of the East Isaac Comnenus. Although since the arrival of the Varangian 
Guard in 988, this elite unit had always remained faithful to its employer the 
Emperor, this was the first case where the rare phenomenon of Varangians 
facing each other is reported. The most possible explanation, however, is that 
the Emperor’s Varangians were the “Varangians of the City”, the personal 
guard of Michael VI, while Isaac must have won, not the hearts and minds, 
but rather the pockets of the “Varangians outside of the City”, who were in 
Armenia fighting the seljuks just before Isaac’s coup d’etat broke out. 
skylitzes and Matthew of Edessa mention the presence of Franks, this 
time specifically put on horseback, sent to Upper Armenia by Michael VI 
(1056-57) to fight-back a seljuk raiding party in 1056, again under the 
command of Hervé88. And this Frankish contingent not only managed to 
push back the seljuks but successfully pursued the retreating Turks. This 
was a very risky battle-tactic indeed, if we consider the characteristic battle-
tactic of the steppe people – the feigned retreat – the aim of which was 
to confuse and demoralize the enemy, isolate and break-up the enemy’s 
formations89. 
85. skylitzes, I, 474-5. 
86. Matthew of Edessa, Chronique, tr. E. dulaurier, Paris 1858, 99-102; The Chronicle 
of Matthew of Edessa, II, 3, p. 87; skylitzes, I, 474-5; Aristakès de Lastivert, 79-80.
87. skylitzes, I, 485; probably in a region called Dagabare: P. MaGdalino, The Byzantine 
Army and the Land: from stratiotikon ktema to Military Pronoia, in: Byzantium at War (9th-
12th Century), Εθνικό Ιδρυμα Ερευνών, Athens 1997, 28-9; a. J. siMpson, Three sources of 
military unrest in Asia Minor: the Norman chieftains Hervé Frankopoulos, Robert Crispin 
and Roussel de Bailleul, Mesogeios/Mediterranée 9-10 (2000), 185.
88. skylitzes, I, 485; Matthew of Edessa, Chronique, 99-102; The Chronicle of Matthew 
of Edessa, II, 3, p. 87. 
89. some expert works on seljuk warfare are: Oman, The Art of War in the Middle 
Ages, v. I, pp. 206-19, 273-4; r. c. sMail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), Cambridge 1956, 
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Regarding Isaac’s rebellion skylitzes mentions that the general 
Catacalon Cecaumenus, one of the ring-leaders, was sent to Chaldea and 
Colonia to gather troops for Comnenus’ upcoming rebellion, and he came 
up with “two Frankish τάγματα and one Russian who were spending the 
winter in these areas”90. For these mercenary troops that eventually but very 
reluctantly followed Isaac Comnenus to his siege of Constantinople, in 1057, 
we have an eye-witness description of them from Psellus, who was one of 
the ambassadors sent by Michael VI to negotiate with Isaac: “There were 
Italians, and scyths from the Taurus, men of fearful appearance, dressed 
in fearful garb, both alike glaring fiercely about them. The one [the Franks] 
made their attacks as their spirit moved them, were impetuous and led by 
impulse, the other [the Varangians] with a mad fury; the former in their first 
onslaught were irresistible, but they quickly lost their ardour; the latter, on 
the other hand, were less impatient, but fought with unsparing devotion 
and a complete disregard for wounds”91. What we see in this description by 
Psellus is the whole theme that dominated the Byzantine military manuals, 
from the Strategicon to the Tactica92, where the Franks were characterised by 
the tremendous impact of their cavalry charge and their limited stamina. 
From the late 1040s, but mainly in the 1050s, the Franks would have 
been permanently established in areas pointed out by the governmental 
officials to live off the land. They would have been quartered for the winter 
in the Armeniac thema, where we find their leaders holding large estates 
in the immediate period that follows, while many of them should have 
been stationed in the neighbouring themata of Chaldea, Iberia and Colonia 
along with a number of Varangians93. Thus, a very valuable source is the 
exemption acts (chrysobulls), granted to landowners or monastic houses 
from the obligation of providing shelter and all the neccessary supplies to 
75-83; J. France, Victory in the East, A Military History of the First Crusade, Cambridge 
1999, 147-9; see also: N. zBinden, Abendlaendische Ritter, Griechen und Tuerken im ersten 
Kreuzzug: zur Problematik ihrer Begegnung, Athens 1975.
90. skylitzes, I, 490.
91. Psellus, 199-200; Chronographia, VII. 25, 289.
92. Das Strategikon des Maurikios, ed. by G. T. dennis, 1981; Maurice’s Strategikon: 
handbook of Byzantine military strategy, English translation by G. T. Dennis, Philadelphia 
1984 (latest edition: 2010), XI. 3, pp. 119-20; Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 80-95.
93. skylitzes, I, 474.
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the Imperial troops94. This policy might be considered as an attempt not 
only to settle down these restless warriors, especially in a sensitive frontier 
area like the north-east Asia Minor, but also to avoid paying by cash in a 
period when the collapse of the economy was at its first stages and the coin 
had already been significantly debased by Constantine IX95. 
The second of the three Frankish commanders to be found in Byzantium 
in our period of studying was Robert Crispin96. He had followed a rather 
similar career pattern as Hervé, having sailed to Constantinople, as Amatus 
tells us, “to become a noble (chevalerie) at the Emperor’s Court”, probably 
between 1067-6997. Attaleiates tells us that after his arrival Robert was 
immediately sent east to the Frankish camps to spend the winter of 1068/9, 
along with the rest of his followers98. It is not possible to put down an exact 
figure for the troops under his command at this early stage, but Matthew of 
Edessa does mention a strong garrison of 200 Frankish knights at sewawerat, 
north of Edessa in northern Mesopotamia, defending the castle against a
94. Actes de Lavra, ed. G. rouillard – p. colloMp, Paris 1937, 1, 28, 80; saThas, 
Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi, (6 vols.), Venice-Paris 1872-94, 1, 55. For more on these sources, 
see: haldon, Warfare, State and Society, 146-48; A. kazhdan, B. Fonkic, Novoe izdanie 
actor Lavry i ego znachenie dlja vizantinovedenija, VizVrem 34 (1973), 49; G. osTroGorsky, 
Pour l’histoire de l’immunité a Byzance, Byzantion 28 (1958), 165-254; G. leVenioTes, Το 
στασιαστικό κίνημα του Νορμανδού �υρσελίου (Ursel de Bailleul) στην Μικρά Ασία, 
1073-1076, M. Phil. Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 66ff.
95. hendy, M., Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450, Cambridge 
1985 (latest edition: 2008); a. laiou – c. Morrisson, The Byzantine Economy, Cambridge 
2007; a. harVey, Economic expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-1200, Cambridge 1989; 
p. leMerle, The Agrarian History of Byzantium from the origins to the Twelfth century. The 
Sources and the Problems, Galway 1979.
96. For traces of the Crispin family in Normandy and post-Conquest England, see: M. 
Fauroux, Recueil des Actes des Ducs de Normandie de 911 à 1066, Caen 1961, 33, 34 (n. 
77).
97. Amatus, I. 8. Although the exact date is not specified by any source, we presume it 
would not have been long before his rebellion, in spring 1069, against Romanus IV (1068-71). 
In 1066 he was still in the service of Richard I of Capua. see: G. a. loud, A calendar of 
diplomas of Norman princes in Capua, Papers of the British School at Rome 36 (1981), 
121-22.
98. συνδιαπλευσάντων αὐτῷ καὶ συναφικομένων ὁμογενῶν: Attaleiates, 96.
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seljuk raid in 1065/6699. Could this mean that by the end of the decade 
Robert would have had a substantial following of several hundred knights?
After several acts of insubordination, in 1069, against imperial authority 
in the regions neighbouring his Armeniac base at Μαυρόκαστρον100 Crispin 
must have had a substantial number of followers by that time -some four 
hundred if we believe Attaleiates and Bryennius who relate the army that 
Roussel of Bailleul took over with that which Robert Crispin commanded 
before him101. 
After the defeat at Mantzikert and the deposition of Romanus, the new 
emperor Michael VII Doukas restored Crispin to his former command and 
greatly filled his castle with imperial gifts, clearly in an attempt to gain a 
strong ally against the legitimate Emperor102. skylitzes tells us that in the 
campaign launched against the latter, in spring 1072, under Andronicus 
Doucas, where Robert was in command of the army’s left wing103. This 
would have raised great resentment and discontent, both against Crispin 
and the Emperor, from the Byzantine generals which it is duly noted by 
Cecaumenos in his Στρατηγικόν, written between the years 1075-78: “The 
foreigners, if they do not come from the royal family of their land, do not 
raise them in great offices nor trust them with significant titles; because if 
you honour the foreigner with the officium of πριμικήριος or στρατηγός, 
then what is the point of giving the generalship to a Roman? You will turn 
him [the Roman] into an enemy”104. A precedent of a Frank commanding a 
large division of the Byzantine army had already been set by Hervé in 1049. 
However the fundamental distinction, though, between these two cases is 
that Hervé commanded a division of fellow Franks under the command of a 
Byzantine general-in-command against foreign invaders (Patzinak invasion 
of 1049), while Crispin participated in civil conflicts, having the full support 
of an Emperor that the rest of the Byzantine generals quite possibly would 
99. The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, II, 27, pp. 107-8. Matthew also notes the 
presence of a Frank in the garrison of Edessa for the same year. Ibid., II, 28, p. 109.
100. Attaleiates, 98.
101. Attaleiates, 145; Bryennius, 147.
102. Attaleiates 97.
103. Bryennius, 135; Psellus underlines the crucial role played by Crispin in his attacking 
and breaking the enemy centre division with his cavalry unit: Psellus, 257; Chronographia, 
VII. 31-32, pp. 363-4. Attaleiates, 132-34.
104. Cecaumenos, 95.
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not have had, and apparently he was the dominant figure in Andronicus’ 
army in 1072, inspiring admiration not only by his men but from Byzantine 
troops as well105. The last mentioning of Robert Crispin comes from Psellus, 
probably around 1073, and has to do with his death106. 
The most famous of the Franks to have been employed by Constantinople 
in the second half of the eleventh century was, undoubtedly, Roussel of 
Bailleul, Roger Hauteville’s principal lieutenant in sicily, who won the day 
for the Normans at the battle of Cerami in June 1063107. The fact that he 
is no longer mentioned by the “Italian” chroniclers after Cerami suggests 
that, around that period of stalemate in sicily he decided to pursue a more 
profitable career across the Adriatic. The next mentioning of Roussel comes 
in 1071 and Romanus IV’s fatal third campaign against the seljuks where, 
according to Attaliates, Roussel’s contingent numbered around five hundred 
although no exact figures are provided108. This is important because it points 
out the dominant role played by Roussel in the command of the Frankish 
contingents after the “discharge” of Robert Crispin to Abydos just before 
the campaign109.
The first signs of Roussel’s ambitions for the Imperial throne can be seen 
in his insurrection against the ruling Doukas family (winter of 1073/4)110. 
Challenging Isaac Comnenus’ authority during an expedition against the 
seljuks, Roussel defeated him in an open battle and in command of just 
400 men (1074). Roussel’s army during that period must have increased 
significantly, from 400 men to around 2.700-3.000 men, all cavalry, in just a 
few months. While at the same time, his estates and thus his power had been 
growing rapidly, thus turning him into one of the most powerful nobles in 
north-eastern Asia Minor, “having gathered a considerable force made up 
partly of his own countrymen and partly of other nationalities”111. He had 
105. Attaleiates, 134; his role is more clearly seen in Psellus’ account: Psellus, 257; 
Chronographia, VII. 39, p. 364.
106. Psellus, 257; Chronographia, VII. 39, p. 363; Bryennius, 134.
107. Malaterra, 2. 33. For Geoffrey Ridel, see: p. skinner, Family Power in Southern 
Italy: the Duchy of Gaeta and its neighbours, 850-1139, Cambridge 1995, 157. 
108. Attaliates, 115; Zonaras, III, 697; Haldon, Byzantine Wars, 171.
109. Amatus mentions that Roussel was captured by Alp-Arslan and released afterwards 
with Romanus, see: Amatus, I. 11.
110. Attaleiates, 143ff.; Alexiad, I. i, pp. 11-12.
111. Attaleiates 145-6; Zonaras, III, 709-712. Anna Comnena is our only source that 
does not talk solely about Franks in Roussel’s contingent. It is possible that she might be 
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managed to take advantage of the desperation of the local inhabitants of 
the areas of Lykaonia and Galatia, on the Armeniac thema, for protection 
against the seljuk raids, by establishing himself in the area and rapidly 
winning the support of the population112. 
It would be in the face of Alexius Comnenus that Roussel would find 
a cunning and much formidable rival. sent in Amaseia in 1075 the young 
officer resorted to the plundering of Roussel’s estates and besieging the 
principal cities under his control, thus denying him his source of revenue 
and avoiding a pitched battle113.
Undoubtedly, the period of Alexius’ maturing years, meaning the 
collapsing period of the 1070s when the latter was a young officer in the 
service of the Doukas family, must had taught him a lot about how to deal 
with mercenaries, and especially the Westerners. In a significant change of 
tactics towards them, he may have allowed some of them to have their own 
commander after becoming an Emperor, but Constantine Humbertopoulos, 
a nephew of Robert Guiscard, had been living in Byzantium for a long time, 
and judging from his Orthodox-Greek name he was not a newcomer who 
had raised his own followers in a distant Imperial province, but rather a 
trusted Imperial officer who actively assisted Alexius’ rise to the throne114. 
Humbertopoulos also took part in the 1081 campaign against Robert 
Guiscard’s siege of Dyrrachium, commanding a “regiment of Franks”. But 
Alexius did not make the mistake of deploying the Frankish regiments in 
some distant winter camps in eastern Anatolia or in the Balkans, although 
confused, since she is writing about seven decades later. see: Alexiad, I. i, p. 12. In our 
contemporary primary sources like Attaleiates, skylitzes and Bryennius the Franks are 
mentioned as cavalry, thus I presume that it would have been unlikely for Roussel to have 
introduced native infantry men in his contingent. Turks would have been employed quite 
easily but our sources would certainly have mentioned any Turks and Franks fighting side 
by side. 
112. Bryennius, 167,185. Attaleiates 153. shepard, the Uses of the Franks, 303,  notes 
that the collection of taxes in the name of Roussel would have been undertaken by the official 
tax-collectors of the Byzantine state .
113. Bryennius, 185; simpson, Three sources of military unrest, 196; Alexiad, I. ii, pp. 
13-14. The tactic of avoiding battle unless it is of the utmost need is stressed by Vegetius, 
Leo VI and Nicephoros Phocas, in their military manuals: Vegetius: Epitome of Military 
Science, tr. by N. P. Milner, Liverpool 2001, III, 26, 116-9; Leo VI, Tactica, XX. 36; Praecepta 
Militaria, IV. 192-208, p. 50.
114. Alexiad, II. iv-v, pp. 93-104; shepard, The Uses of the Franks, 303-4. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:08:50 |
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 22 (2012) 125-156
RUs, VARANGIAN AND FRANkIsH MERCENARIEs 151
someone might wonder if there were indeed any areas under Byzantine control 
in Asia Minor in the 1080s where the Franks could have been deployed, but 
he rather kept them in the capital under his close supervision115.
Conclusions
In this paper I had the chance to examine two types of mercenaries 
that were employed by the Empire for its wars since the second half of the 
ninth century. On the one hand we had the Rus of kiev who were employed 
in large numbers by the Byzantine government on the grounds of treaties 
that were signed with the official kiev authorities since their first siege of 
Constantinople in 860 and were occasionally renewed in the tenth century. 
The fundamental difference between these troops and the units of the 
Varangian Guard that arrived in the capital in 988 was that the former 
were recruited as individuals or in large groups, but they never formed a 
distinct unit like the Varangians. The Franks, on the other hand, that are 
first recorded in service in Constantinople in the mid-eleventh century can 
be characterised as the typical “soldiers of fortune” � a term which may 
sound commonplace but it encapsulates the degree of individualism that 
characterised the relatively small number of western mercenaries that 
descended in Constantinople and which can be viewed as the source of 
their fighting techniques. And although they were registered in the Imperial 
payrolls, thus receiving a regular and fixed pay, they were materialistic 
individuals that could desert their employers whenever suited them best.
The second half of the tenth century marked a period of expansion for 
the Byzantine state in its eastern borders, with units of Rus taking part in 
the expeditions against the Umayyad Arabs of Crete in 902, 949 and again in 
960/1 when the island’s capital (Chandax) finally capitulated, while evidence 
from primary sources allow us to locate them in northern Mesopotamia, 
Armenia and syria throughout the middle decades of the tenth century. It 
is impossible to assess the numbers of the Rus in Byzantine service at any 
period, but judging from the nature of their campaigns and from whatever 
pieces of evidence we can collect and put together from the primary sources, 
we understand that they would have been primarily infantry units that had 
115. The aforementioned Frankish regiment under Humbertopoulos is clearly seen 
to have been based at Constantinople before Alexius’ campaign against the Normans in 
Dyrrachium, in August 1081: Alexiad, IV. iv,  199.
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very similar equipment to their scandinavian relatives and were completely 
unfamiliar to mounted warfare. Unfortunately, the amount of information 
we have does not allow us to reconstruct in detail their fighting tactics in 
the plains and mountainous terrains of syria, Cilicia and Armenia. Probably 
they would have been elite heavily armed regiments of spearmen that would 
operate in conjunction with other elite tagmatic units of the Imperial Army, 
either occupying a place in the centre of the infantry formation before a 
pitched battle or � as the military treatises of the period suggest � take the 
role of javeliners in the high mountain passes of the Taurus against the 
expeditionary forces of the Muslims. 
A turning point in the history of mercenary units was the year 988, 
when the famous 6,000 strong Varangian Guard arrived in the Imperial 
Court. Chronicler material puts the Varangians at Antioch in 999, restoring 
order in the vicinity of the syrian capital, while next year they were to 
be found in Armenia. But the most significant operational theatre in Basil 
II’s reign was Bulgaria and the struggle against Tsar samuel (1001-1018). 
Although no specific mentioning of them can be found in the primary 
sources of the period, the Varangians � perhaps not the entire regiment but 
certainly a significant number of them � would have had a leading role in 
the sweeping operations against the Bulgarian forces in the central Balkan 
area. Further, a unit of Varangians was transported to Italy in the same 
period to face a rebellion of Lombards in Apulia, again playing a key role in 
the operations to suppress a local insurrection. And because the Lombard 
rebels enjoyed the military assistance of several hundred Norman cavalry 
men, that operation marked the first contact between Byzantine forces and 
the newly arrived Normans in Italy, although it would have been extremely 
interesting if we had any first-hand evidence as to what impression did the 
Norman fighting tactics made upon the men of the Guard.
The regiment of the Varangians would have consisted of heavy infantry 
units that were using horses for transportation and would dismount before 
battle in their typical Viking fashion. Their equipment would have been very 
similar, if not identical, to their scandinavian relatives with contemporary 
or later accounts of the sources – including the illustrations from the 
skylitzes manuscript in Madrid116, identifying the famous battle-axes, an 
116. a. GraBar – M. Manoussacas, L’illustration du manuscrit de Skylitzes de la 
Bibliotheque Nationale de Madrid, Venice 1979; V. TsaMakda, The Illustrated Chronicle 
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ideal weapon for infantry warfare117. As an elite and experienced unit they 
would have been used in special operations like the siege of a city or a castle 
and in large-scale battles they would have probably been put in the centre of 
the formation to repel any enemy cavalry attack. And Bulgaria would have 
been an operational theatre that favoured the use of these Viking warriors 
in smaller units, since the rough and fragmented terrain and the nature of 
the operations (i.e. siege of Bulgarian strongholds) did not favour mounted 
warfare. In addition, the operational role of the Varangian Guard was 
expanded in 1034 after the arrival of Harald Hardrada in Constantinople. 
The scandinavian experience in naval warfare and the change in Imperial 
politics towards the establishment of a powerful navy during the reign of 
Romanus III, strongly favoured the assigning of units of the Guard into 
policing duties in the eastern Mediterranean. 
The 1040s was the decade that saw the arrival in large numbers of 
the first Frankish mercenaries in the Byzantine capital (1047). These were 
all primarily cavalry units, fighting in their usual Frankish manner of 
mounting a frontal cavalry charge against the enemy, a battle tactic that had 
been well known in France for several decades118. And we also have evidence 
that the Byzantines were well aware of the charge of the Frankish chivalry, 
judging by the writings of Leo VI in the early tenth century119. Their main 
operational role, judging by the evidence provided by our chroniclers, was 
the manning of key towns and fortresses in strategic border areas in both 
the Balkans and Asia Minor. A fundamental difference between these 
troops and the Rus of the previous period is that the former were serving 
under their own commanders after 1049. Indeed, the presence of Frankish 
troops in Imperial service after the late 1040s has largely depended on the 
ambitions of their leaders, and three names are frequently mentioned by the 
primary sources of this period; Hervé the Frangopolos (1049-63), Robert 
Crispin (1067/9-73) and Roussel of Bailleul (1064-80). All of them seem to 
have had a remarkably similar career, arriving in Byzantium with an already 
of Ioannes Skylitzes in Madrid, Leiden 2002; a. B. hoFFMeyer, Military Equipment in the 
Byzantine Manuscript of Scylitzes in Biblioteca National in Madrid, Granada 1966.
117. kolias, Waffen, 162-73; k. deVries, Medieval Military Technology, Ontario 1992, 
16-18.
118. J. France, “La Guerre dans la France feodale à la fin du IXe et au Xe siècle”, Revue 
Belge d’Histoire Militaire 23(1979), 189ff.
119. Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 80-98.
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established reputation in sicily (Hervé and Roussel) and spain (Crispin). 
Thus, they were immediately transferred to a crucial border area of the 
Empire, either to the Balkans to face the Patzinaks (Hervé) or the Cumans 
(Roussel) or to Armenia (Crispin). They all had established their lands in the 
Armeniac theme and, already since the early years of their careers, they had 
managed to gather a significant number of knights in their service, varying 
from 400 to 2,500 men. Although great land-owners, it is very difficult 
to establish whether the troops in their service were household knights 
or mercenaries living off the land, or possibly both. We should highlight, 
however, that Crispin was the only one of the three who had the chance 
to command Imperial troops in military operations during the civil wars 
that followed the defeat at Mantzikert, contrary to the others who, although 
were deployed in combat alongside Imperial forces, they never commanded 
Imperial troops themselves. Eventually, their ambitions led them to mount 
rebellions against the Byzantine Emperors and they were involved in this 
period’s civil strives, taking the side of the highest bidder.
It has frequently appeared throughout this study the reference to the 
Franks as materialistic volunteers who would desert their paymasters at 
any time120. However, this can be quite misleading and the long-established 
view of them being the main cause for numerous rebellions throughout the 
centuries has been challenged by a recent series of studies121. And, indeed, 
the arguments are simple enough; no evidence can support the fact that 
indigenous troops, either thematic or tagmatic, were more loyal to the central 
government than the Franks were. In fact, more rebellions were mounted by 
the armies of the East or West in the second half of the eleventh century 
than the Franks were even capable of. second, there is a direct correlation 
between the timing of these rebellions and their political context; Hervé 
turned against the weak government of Michael VI in the summer of 1057 
which strangely coincided with the rebellion of two of the most senior 
Byzantine generals; Robert Crispin’s insubordination against Romanus IV’s 
government took place in the Armeniac thema (spring 1069), a region with 
a political power vacuum for at least a decade due to the Turkish infiltration; 
and it was in the same region that Roussel of Bailleul had established his 
base when he was involved in the civil wars of the 1070s. In this political 
120. Attaleiates, 96,98; Strategikon, XI. 3, p. 119; Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII.  82-84.
121. shepard, The Uses of the Franks; haldon, Warfare, State and Society, 85-93.
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context, it was the indigenous troops that played a dominant role in the 
events rather than the Frankish mercenaries. Finally, as shepard rightly 
puts it, it was the colourful risings of rebels that excited the curiosity of the 
chroniclers, and there may have been many “Frankish” commanders whose 
service in Byzantium was almost as illustrious as Crispin or Roussel’s, but 
who never behaved in such a way as to attract attention; that is, they never 
revolted122.
122. shepard, The Uses of the Franks, 276.
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rus, VaranGian and Frankish Mercenaries in The serVice oF The 
ByzanTine eMperors (9Th-11Th c.)
nuMBers, orGanisaTion and BaTTle TacTics in The operaTional TheaTres 
oF asia Minor and The Balkans
This study examines two significantly different mercenary groups 
(Varangians and Franks) that played a vital part in the organisation and 
structure of the Byzantine armies after the ninth century and compare 
their fighting tactics with those of their enemies on each of the two major 
operational theatres of the Byzantine Empire: the Balkans and Asia 
Minor. structuring my analysis not on a chronological basis but rather 
on the different enemies that these mercenaries were facing in different 
geographical conditions, the main objective of this paper is to examine what 
evidence do we have about the organisation of the mercenary units of the 
Rus, the Varangians and the Franks and in the numbers in which they were 
descending at Constantinople,  the political circumstances that led to their 
employment and their standing in the Byzantine military establishment and 
� most importantly � what do we know about their battle and siege tactics 
and their overall role in each operational theatre.
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